We study the adjustment process of a small open economy to a sudden worsening of external condi ons. To model the sudden stop , we use a highly non-linear specifica on that captures credit constraints in a convenient way. The advantage of our approach is that the effects of the shock become highly condi onal on the external debt posi on of the economy. We adopt a two-sector model with money-in-the-u lity, which allows us to study sectoral asymmetries in the adjustment process, and also the role of currency mismatch. We calibrate the model to the behavior of the Hungarian economy in the 2000s and its crisis experience in 2008-11 in par cular. We also calculate four counterfactuals: two with different exchange rate policies (a more flexible float and a perfect peg), and then these two policy regimes with smaller ini al indebtedness. Overall, our model is able to fit movements of key aggregate and sectoral macroeconomic variables a er the crisis by producing a large and protracted deleveraging process. It also offers a meaningful quan fica on of the policy tradeoff between facilita ng the real adjustment by le ng the currency depreciate and protec ng consump on expenditures by limi ng the adverse effect of exchange rate movements on household balance sheets.
Although in the US the main problem was the near collapse of financial intermedia on, in many small emerging economies the key feature of the recession was a sudden worsening of external credit condions. Taking such a shi in the external financing premium as given, our goal is to study the quan ta ve effects of such an exogenous shock using a small open economy model. Rela ve to the large literature on this topic, we adopt a novel specifica on of the external finance premium, which leads to a strong interna onal transmission of shocks through financial markets (like in Devereux and Yetman, 2010) , and resembles more complex frameworks of occasionally binding credit constraints (like Mendoza, 2010) in three important aspects: (i) a near-constant interest rate when net foreign assets are posi ve, (ii) a quickly rising premium for large debt holdings, and (iii) the (almost) existence of an absolute borrowing constraint. 1 This allows us to study the effects of the crisis condi onal on the external debt posi on of our model economy, in a tractable and parsimonious way.
We then link the impact of the external financing shock to the exchange rate regime of the country.
Exis ng models (for example, Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci, 2007, or Faia, 2010) usually quan fy the welfare costs of the constraint that a pegged regime puts on the response of an economy to such a shock: on the one hand, flexible exchange rates allow a quicker nominal adjustment in case of nominal fric ons (price or wage s ckiness); and on the other hand, in order to defend the exchange rate, the central bank has to raise interest rates, which -through financial fric ons -exacerbates the ini al output loss. In case of domes c (or a mix of domes c and foreign) shocks, however, Faia (2010) finds that a peg can allow a so er reac on of the interest rate, hence a smaller output response.
We, on the other hand, want to explore the following advantage of a pegged (or managed float) regime in response to an increase in the external premium. Emerging economies, and countries in Central and Eastern Europe in par cular, have built up significant unhedged foreign currency liabili es before the 2008 crisis (currency mismatch). Figure 2 shows that foreign currency lending was prevelant in at least some countries in the CEE region, notably in Hungary and to a lesser extent in Poland. Not coincidentally, and consistent with our modeling assump ons, more heavily indebted countries relied more on foreign currency financing (see also Figure 1 ). A sudden ghtening of external borrowing terms decreases the demand for local currency, pu ng nominal exchange rates under pressure. Normally, such a deprecia on facilitates the adjustment of the economy, by allowing tradable prices and produc on costs (real wages) to fall. In contrast, under a currency mismatch, the resul ng deprecia on severely weakens the balance sheets (foreign currency value of net wealth) of almost all economic actors (households, firms and the government) in such countries, amplifying the impact of the crisis. In the CEE region, central banks in mismatch countries were indeed defending their exchange rates both by interest rate hikes and interven ons, in order to limit the deteriora on of balance sheets (for Hungary, see Gereben, Karvalits and Kocsis, 2011).
To sum up, we seek answers to the following ques ons. Can we capture the large and persistent impact of the crisis on small open economies with a single shock to foreign borrowing condi ons? Are there important asymmetries between the traded and the non-traded sector? How do the effects depend on the external debt posi on of this economy? Can and should the central bank alleviate the real effects by manipula ng the nominal exchange rate? How does the policy response depend on currency mismatch?
To answer these ques ons, we build a quan ta ve two-sector small open economy model with endogenous currency mismatch through foreign currency borrowing and money in the u lity. The role of the la er is to provide a (reduced form) ra onal for households to hold domes c currency denominated assets. We assume that foreign borrowing has to be in foreign currency, and the interest rate is dependent on the indebtedness of the economy. The main shock we are interested in is a permanent ghtening of external credit condi ons, implemented as a rise in the foreign interest premium. Technically, we look at the long-run effects of a permanent, unexpected shock (a transi on from an ini al to a new steady state). An important methodological contribu on of our paper is that by working in a determinis c framework, we are able to solve the model nonlinearly. This allows us to use a highly nonlinear and asymmetric specifica on for the interest premium func on.
As we already discussed, our mo va on comes from the crisis experience of Hungary and other countries in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region. In order to match the ini al developments in these countries, we add a second, one period shock that captures the large drop in foreign demand. 2 Since this shock lasts only for one period, it plays essen ally no role in the persistence of the effects of the crisis in our model economy, which is solely explained by the permanent shock to foreign borrowing condi ons.
We describe the model in detail later, but the main intui on is as follows. The increase in the interest premium makes households poorer, and its also makes foreign debt more costly. Households respond by paying back debt through reducing consump on, working more, and decreasing their money demand.
There is also an investment decline, due to higher borrowing costs. In response to the decrease in export demand, employment in the export sector decreases, while households borrow more to smooth consump on and work less due to lower labor demand and hence lower wages. The ini al net effect in the short run depends on the strength of these o en opposing effects, but a er the first period the interest premium shock drives the economy.
Depending on the exchange rate regime, the money market clears in different ways, which has important implica ons for the real economy. When the exchange rate is flexible, it depreciates to match the reduced demand for the fixed nominal supply of money. The lower exchange rate, in turn, s mulates exports, and dampens the effect of the export demand shock. Consump on falls, however, since the lower exchange rate increases the indebtedness of the economy measured in foreign currency (tradables).
When the exchange rate is fixed, the export sector cannot take advantage of a weaker currency, hence exports and employment fall more. This is par cularly severe under downward nominal wage rigidity, which we allow for. Households, on the other hand, can use their money holdings to pay back foreign debt at the fixed exchange rate, and hence their balance sheet remains in a be er shape. This, in turn, implies that consump on declines less than under a flexible exchange rate. One of our main goals is to quan ta vely evaluate the links between export performance, consump on, currency mismatch, and the exchange rate regime. opposed to a pure float or a fixed exchange rate regime). (iii) And finally, we assume that the external premium depends on the net foreign asset posi on of households, instead of the consolidated posi on of the country itself (which would also include central bank reserves).
This la er assump on is the main channel for the impact of currency mismatch. In Benczur and Konya (2013), the mechanism is that the central bank earns a lower interest rate on reserves than what households pay on foreign debt, hence holding the domes c currency asset (which has to be backed by foreign exchange reserves) has a real effect on the economy. In our current model, while a deprecia on in general leads to a capital loss of households, it also implies a nearly offse ng capital gain at the central bank. But due to our external premium specifica on, even if this gain is redistributed to households, there is s ll a worsening in the external premium, impac ng the real economy. In other words, repaying foreign currency debt from local currency assets is not neutral: although there is a corresponding decline in central bank reserves, the external financing premium s ll declines. Note that while we make a strong assump on, the mechanism operates as long as central bank reserves and foreign debt are not perfect subs tutes.
Once we described our model economy, we calibrate the model to fit important aggregate and sectoral aspects of the Hungarian economy. Then we introduce the shocks of 2008 by an export demand shock and a change in the parameters of the external premium func on (a large decline in the neutral level of the net foreign asset posi on), fi ng exchange rate, interest rate and tradable output changes.
Overall, we judge the model's ability to fit key macroeconomic variables to be very good: all variables move in the expected direc on, and the magnitudes are also reasonable. In par cular, in response to an ini al increase of 485 basis points in the external premium, consump on expenditures fall by 17%, investment falls by 46%, the nontraded-traded rela ve price falls by 19.5%, and they do not completely recover for more than a decade. Though these numbers are larger than the ini al drops we observed in Hungary, the three-year cumula ve impacts are quite similar. The rela ve performance of the two exchange rate regimes also changes: we find that increased exchange rate flexibility would have been beneficial, had Hungary been less indebted in 2008.
The paper is organized as follows. The next sec on describes the model. Sec on 3 presents our quan ta ve exercise: model calibra on, the impact of the crisis, and the three counterfactual scenarios.
Finally, Sec on 4 concludes.
The model
To understand the impact of the crisis, we build a two-sector small open economy model, based on the approach in Benczur and Konya (2013). The economy produces non-tradables and exports, while non-tradables and imports are used for consump on and investment. Households consume, invest into physical capital, supply labor, and allocate their financial assets between foreign bonds and domes c money holdings. Households pay an interest premium on foreign bonds, which depends on the indebtedness of the country as in Schmi -Grohé and Uribe (2003), and hence taken as exogenous by households. Money is valued because it enters directly into the u lity func on.
Our goal is to have a framework with currency mismatch, non-linearity in the finance premium, and slow adjustment of real variables. As we show later, money-in-the-u lity generates currency mismatch.
The determinis c framework and the par cular specifica on of the foreign interest premium allows for highly non-linear effects from foreign borrowing. Slow adjustment on the real side comes from investment adjustment costs at the sectoral level.
Produc on
Final composite investment and consump on goods are assembled from imported (M) and non-tradable (N) intermediate inputs. Export goods and non-tradables are produced domes cally using capital and labor. Note that, following Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2007), we assume that domes cally produced tradables are exported (X), while tradables used in consump on and investment are imported.
Capital is specific to a sector, and investment is subject to adjustment costs (see below at the household sec on). We use this assump on to prevent large realloca ons across sectors; a similar assump on was used in Bems and Hartelius (2006).
Final goods
Investment in sectors X and N and final consump on are aggregates of imported and non-tradable goods, and are assembled by compe ve firms using Cobb-Douglas technologies. When describing the produc on technology for investment, it is important to account for the quadra c adjustment costs.
Using I j,t for investment in sector j net of adjustment costs and C t for consump on, we can write the produc on func ons as follows: 3
where ϕ measures the extent of investment adjustment costs. Because we lack data on the tradable intensity of investment at the sectoral level, we assume that this intensity is not sector specific (λ I ).
Cost-minimiza on and free entry (zero profits) can be used to calculate the demand func ons for the imported and non-tradable components of consump on and investment, and the price indexes for the final goods. We assume that only imported tradables are used in consump on and investment, as in Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2007) . The law of one price holds for import goods, and we normalize the foreign importable price to unity, so that P M t = S t , where S t is the nominal exchange rate. Demand for imports and non-tradables in consump on and investment can be wri en as:
The price indexes for consump on and investment are given by:
Intermediate goods
Exports and non-tradables are produced using capital and labor. The produc on func ons in both sectors are Cobb-Douglas:
where N j,t is labor employed in sector j, and K j,t is capital used in sector j.
Firms maximize profits, subject to factor prices W t and r k j,t (measured in domes c currency):
The first-order condi ons of the problem are given by
Households
There is a range of households with measure 1 in the economy. Households can hold three types of assets: capital, interest bearing foreign bonds and non interest bearing domes c money. We assume that domes c money is not accepted by the rest of the world. For accoun ng purposes we also introduce nominal bonds D t , which households use to acquire cash from the central bank. As in chapter 5 of Végh (2012), and without loss of generality, we assume that they do not pay interest. 4 These bonds may or may not be accepted by the monetary authority, depending on the currency regime. Because they bear no interest, households want to sell as much as the central bank is willing to accept. We relegate the detailed descrip on of monetary policy to a later sec on.
Households draw income from (i) supplying labor, (ii) ren ng out capital to firms, and (iii) holding foreign bonds and domes c money. They allocate some of their income towards consump on and investment, and carry the remaining amount over to the next period in terms of financial assets. Although money does not pay interest, it is valued by households as it enters the u lity func on directly (moneyin-the-u lity). It can also yield a financial return in case of an exchange rate apprecia on. Households can freely adjust their por olios between money and bonds within a period. In addi on, households accumulate capital for both the export and non-tradable sectors. As discussed above, investment is subject to quadra c adjustment costs.
Households are monopolis c suppliers of differen ated labor services N i,t , as in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000)
. Firms use a CES labor aggregate of individual varie es for produc on, subject to wages set by households
We follow Fahr and Smets (2010) in their specifica on of the wage adjustment func on, which allows us to incorporate downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) in the analysis. Changing wages is subject to a u lity cost Γ (W i,t /W i,t−1 ), where the adjustment cost func on is highly asymmetric. We return to the wage se ng decision in the next sec on.
Household i thus solves the following problem:
4 Any interest revenue would be rebated to households by the central bank.
where R t is the discount rate on foreign currency denominated bonds B it , H it is the stock of domes c money, and N it is the household's labor supply.
A er some simplifica on, the first-order condi ons -apart from the wage se ng decision -are wri en as follows:
(10)
The first equa on is the consump on Euler equa on, the second is money demand, the third is the investment equa on where q j,t is Tobin's q, the fourth is the arbitrage condi on between investment and bonds, and the last is the capital accumula on equa on (restated for convenience). Note that the last three equa ons must hold separately for j = X, N .
Wage se ng
Household i sets the wage rate for its specialized labor services subject to the usual CES demand func on from (8) :
Using this demand func on, and subs tu ng in the first-order condi on for consump on, the wage se ng problem is given by the following:
where ξ it = 1/C i,t is the marginal u lity of consump on. The adjustment cost func on Γ takes the Linex form used in Fahr and Smets (2010) , and is capable of approxima ng DNWR to an arbitrary precision.
The Appendix plots Γ (·) with our parameteriza on that we discuss in the calibra on sec on.
The first-order condi ons are given by the following equa ons:
where
Because households are iden cal ex ante, they will all set the same wage W t . This implies that all other decisions are completely symmetric as well, and aggrega on across households is trivial. In what follows we omit the subscript i, as all household variables will refer to aggregate measures.
The central bank
We follow Végh (2012) in our descrip on of the central bank balance sheet and in the defini ons of a floa ng currency regime and a currency board. We assume that central bank assets include foreign currency b c t and domes c non-interest bearing bonds D t issued by households. 5 The per period budget constraint of the central bank is then given by:
The monetary policy regime is characterized by two parameters, ρ s and ρ h . First, we posit the following policy rule: 
Under a pure float, ρ h = 0, while under a currency board, ρ h = 1. In our baseline we track the actual reserve to money developments in Hungary, including a significant increase during the crisis. In counterfactual experiments we choose reserve paths in line with the corresponding hypothe cal exchange rate regime. We discuss the precise choice of parameter values in sec on 3.1.
Note that the monetary authority manipulates the exchange rate through changes in reserves, or in other words through its (par al) commitment to exchange foreign currency for domes c. Plugging equa on (17) into equa on (16) for the cases where ρ h > 0, we get:
The equa on highlights the extent to which increases in money demand lead to changes in foreign reserves. When the exchange rate is fixed, the money supply changes only through reserves. Under a pure float, the money supply is fixed (we thus implicitly assume no helicopter drop money crea on, i.e.
Equilibrium
To ensure the existence of a well-defined steady state in small open economy models, the literature has used various short-cuts, summarized in Schmi -Grohe and Uribe (2003). These shortcuts essen ally amount to selec ng a level for the steady state NFA and specifying a (reduced form) mechanism driving the economy towards this long-run value. We follow the literature in allowing for a debt-dependent interest rate, but we use a more general func onal form that allows for asymmetry between debt and assets, and a de facto upper limit to foreign borrowing. More precisely, we assume that the interest rate on foreign currency bonds is given by:
where the last term is a modified Linex func on (see Fahr and Smets, 2010 for details), and
Y N t is GDP measured in foreign currency. Figure 3 shows the proper es of this specifica on rela ve to the standard exponen al func on used by Schmi -Grohé and Uribe (2003). The important feature of the Linex specifica on is that it captures three key aspects of the interest premium : (i) (almost) constant interest rate on assets, (iii) quickly rising premium for large debt, and (iii) (almost) existence of an absolute borrowing constraint. Although (i) and (iii) do not hold exactly, one can get arbitrarily close while preserving the smoothness of the premium func on by increasing the parameter ζ.
Note that the interest rate depends on foreign debt incurred by households. 6 In par cular, we do not consolidate b t with central bank reserves b c t . The assump on behind this is that reserves are only used for liquidity provision, but not for bailing out households (or the government). Thus the riskiness of the country -measured by the interest premium -does not depend on the amount of foreign reserves.
As noted before, the results would go through as long as debt and reserves are imperfect subs tutes.
Now we specify market clearing condi ons for non-tradables, exports and imports. Non-tradable market clearing requires that produc on equals consump on plus investment:
We assume that exporters face a downward sloping demand curve:
where demand depends on the foreign price of the good.
To derive the current account from the household budget constraint, we use the condi on that
Under pure floa ng (ρ s = 1, ρ h = 0), money does not enter the current account, and the model is equivalent with a cashless economy (a "real model") with money determined residually. Based on Benczur and Konya (2013), it is easy to see that in this case the local currency interest rate is fixed at its steady state level. 7 With a currency board (ρ s = 0, ρ h = 1), changes in money demand have to be matched by equivalent changes in central bank reserves. Thus in order to increase (decrease) money holdings, the country has to run a current account deficit (surplus).
It is illumina ng to write down the evolu on of net foreign assets, which also includes central bank reserves. To derive the general formula, let R c t indicate the gross interest rate that reserves earn (in our specific case R c t = 1, as discussed above). Moreover, let B t = b t + b c t denote net foreign assets. Using 6 In our interpreta on and calibra on the household sector also includes public debt, and government consump on and investment. 7 Let us define the local currency interest rate as R d t = RtSt+1/St using the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condi on. Benczúr and Kónya (2011) show that under a flexible exchange rate and a constant money supply, nominal spending PtCt is constant. Combing this, the UIP equa on and eq. (9) yields the desired result. the household and central bank budget constraints, it is easy to show that the evolu on of B t is given by:
where T B t is the trade balance denominated in foreign currency.
This equa on makes it clear that currency mismatch operates through two channels in this framework. First, as long as the central bank earns a lower interest rate on reserves than what households pay on foreign debt, holding money (the domes c currency asset) has a real cost for the economy; moreover, the crisis impacts the economy differently through this channel depending on the currency regime.
Second, if reserves (b c t ) and non-reserve foreign debt (−b t ) are not equivalent in their impact on the external interest premium, opposing changes in b c t and b t -which keep B t constant -will s ll have a real effect through a change in the interest premium.
In our model both of these channels are opera onal, since we assume R t > R c t = 1, and only b t enters the interest premium func on. When looking at the impact of the crisis from the angle of currency mismatch, the second channel dominates. Defending the exchange rate allows households to build down domes c savings (H t ), and pay back foreign debt (b t ). This leads to a decrease in central bank reserves and hence there is no immediate improvement in the overall NFA posi on (B t ). Nevertheless, the foreign interest premium declines, because private indebtedness falls. Allowing the exchange rate to depreciate more, on the other hand, decreases the foreign currency value of domes c assets, and hence makes households less able to draw on domes c savings to pay down their foreign debts.
To sum up, equa ons (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (15), (16), (18), (19) , (20) and (21) jointly determine the endogenous variables. This is a system of nonlinear difference equa ons.
Since our model is determinis c, we can use DYNARE to get an arbitrarily precise solu on without resor ng to log-lineariza on. This is important since our specified interest premium rela onship is highly nonlinear; one strength of our approach is that we can keep this nonlinearity in our solu on method.
The experiment
Now we use our model to understand crucial aspects of the financial crisis of 2008 in our small open economy. As we discussed in the Introduc on, the important aspects are (i) an external shock to the interest premium, and (ii) a large temporary decline in export demand.
We set up the experiment to replicate important features of the Hungarian experience. As explained earlier, we present simula ons from a determinis c model, where the economy is ini ally in steady state.
There are two shocks that unexpectedly hit the economy: a one-period drop in export demand, and a permanent change in the amount of foreign indebtedness that markets are willing to tolerate. More precisely, we lower the parameter A in equa on (20) The one-period export demand shock is included to match the short-run response of the economy be er. Also, one can debate if the change in foreign debt tolerance is really permanent. We use this assump on to subs tute for an arbitrary end period, and because we do think the external adjustment needed is here to stay for a long me. We pick the parameters of the interest premium func on (18) based on this figure. In par cular, we use Hungarian and Czech CDS spreads before and a er the crisis, along with the ini al (adjusted) NFA posi ons to pin down the linex parameters. Note that in our model it is the non-reserve part of the total NFA that enters the interest premium func on, so this is the data we use for the calcula ons. We model the crisis as an exogenous shi in the long-run steady state NFA level, but we keep the two shape parameters constant.
Calibra on
We have 4 parameters to calibrate: 2 shape parameters of the linex func on, and 1+1 loca on parameters corresponding to the steady state NFA before and a er the crisis. We proceed as follows. We assume that the ini al level of (nonreserve) NFA in Hungary corresponds to the pre-crisis steady state We normalize the export demand shi parameter in the steady state to A = 1. We then set the one-period shock to ∆A = −0.315, with which we match the decline in exports (rela ve to their 1995-tradable produc on, which is free from inventory dynamics. Note that the parameter change in itself has no meaning, and its only func on is to generate an endogenous decline in exports and employment. These, of course, also depend on the elas city of export demand, and on many other parameters through general equilibrium effects. In par cular, the employment response crucially depends on the interac on of exchange rate flexibility and downward nominal wage rigidity. The elas city of export demand is set to a value that is in line with the es mate of Jakab and Világi (2008). The results are not sensi ve to moderate varia ons in this parameter.
To parameterize the wage adjustment func on (14), we use the following considera ons. First, we set the symmetric cost parameter to ν w = 1, which implies that wage increaces are not costly. Second, we pick the asymmetry parameter (ξ w = 100) such that the adjustment func on becomes very steep just below W t /W t−1 = 0.95. We do this to take account of the fact that there is neither growth nor infla on in our model. In Hungary, by contrast, the infla on target is 3% and we postulate that long-run growth is 2%. Thus we shi the floor to wage adjustment by 5%, the hypothesized steady state growth rate of Hungarian nominal wages. The resul ng wage cost curve is shown on Figure 9 in the Appendix.
Our remaining parameter choices are summarized in Table 1 . In par cular, the discount factor is calibrated to yield an annual real interest rate of 4%. The deprecia on rate is a standard value in the literature, and corresponds to a steady state investment ra o of about 0. To describe monetary policy, we need to pin down the reserves to M2 ra o (ρ h ) before and a er the crisis, and the exchange rate flexibility parameter ρ s . Hungarian reserves increased substan ally during the crisis. We assume this increase was part of the observed policy mix, and model the change as an AR (1) process: 
Results
We plot the results of five simula ons. First, we present the baseline case using the calibra on we discussed in the previous sec on. In par cular, we set the ini al level of non-reserves NFA per GDP to -1.238, and the monetary policy parameters to ρ s = 0.133 and ρ h = 0.452. This, we believe, captures key features of the Hungarian economy when it was hit by the dual shocks to the financing premium and export demand. As explained before, the crises also led to a gradual increase in the money to reserves ra o (to 0.7). Our goal in the baseline scenario is to demonstrate that our calibrated model provides a reasonable quan ta ve descrip on of crisis events, in terms of the size, persistence and sectoral asymmetries of the economy's response. We are interested in the responses of consump on and employment under these alterna ve policy arrangements. We expect that a flexible exchange rate smoothes adjustment to the export demand shock, and hence protects employment in the traded sector. This is especially important in the case of downward nominal wage rigidity and a large shock (rela ve to the 5% steady state growth rate of nominal wages we assume to be present in the data). On the other hand, because of currency mismatch, a fixed exchange rate protects the balance sheet of households (by allowing a reduc on in the risk premium through a decline in local currency assets and private sector foreign indebtedness). Our goal is to quan ta vely evaluate the strength of these two channels under alterna ve exchange rate arrangements. The interest rate and exchange rate paths, which are not targeted by our calibra on a er the first year, are close to the data. The net foreign asset posi on worsens ini ally, then begins to improve. While the The ini al money stock change in the data is much less than the model's predic on, but over three years the match is much closer. The same is true for the tradable-nontradable rela ve price. Nominal rigidi es in price se ng and por olio realloca on costs may be behind the slower ini al response in the data. The intui on the model captures is that households smooth consump on by using their saving as a buffer. In the model, these are in the form of money. In our calibra on, we used M2, so the data points on Figure 6 also refer to M2, but there are probably other forms of domes c savings one could take into account. Another possibility is that due to the crisis, households have an increased demand for liquidity (or precau onary savings), which could be modelled as an increase in the parameter γ.
The baseline
In terms of real variables, the model is quite successful in capturing both ini al changes and further dynamics. Two excep ons include: (i) the much smoother reac on of employment in the data, 9 which 9 Labor hoarding and government policies (like tax changes) could be partly behind the lack of a large employment drop. A is nevertheless reasonably close to the simulated values a er the first period, and (ii) the much less pronounced recovery of exports in the data compared to the vigorouse export growth predicted by the model. Both issues deserve further inves ga on.
Overall, while not perfect, we judge the model's ability to fit key macroeconomic variables to be very good. All variables move in the expected direc on, and the magnitudes are also reasonable. Our results are also comparable to those of Heer and Schubert (2012) . Their permanent risk premium shock implies a shi of 0.3 in the steady state NFA per GDP posi on, causing a 250 basis point jump in the interest rate (on impact). In response, consump on drops by 7%, and the real exchange rate depreciates by 3%.
In our model, the impact of the pure risk premium shock is 300 basis point jump in the interest rate, 10 leading to an 12.5% drop in consump on, and a roughly 6% real deprecia on (10% change in the rela ve price, and an approximately 60% non-traded share in expenditures). Figure 7 presents the results from the first set of counterfactual simula ons. The solid lines are the baseline described above, the lines with squares represent the fixed exchange rate case, and the lines with circles correspond to the more flexible exchange rate case. Under higher flexibility (ρ s = 0.28, ρ h = 0.452), the exchange rate depreciates by more than 25% , and as a result, both the interest premium (not shown) and the NFA per GDP posi ons worsen drama cally. Note that the local currency (HUF) interest rate only increases slightly, due to the assump on on monetary policy. 11 The consump on decline is the largest under this scenario, especially from the second period onwards. Tradable produc on and overall employment, on the other hand, decline the least. Thus our model is capable to generate both the advantages and the disadvantages of a compe ve deprecia on. The export sector declines less and booms more a er the export demand shock passes, but household balance sheets suffer more.
Counterfactuals
Fixing the exchange rate protects households from the impact of the currency mismatch, but at the cost of a deeper drop in exports. Consump on recovers the fastest under this regime, but the recessionin terms of employment -is the deepest. We can also see that keeping the exchange rate fixed requires a substan al increase in the local currency interest rate (interes ngly, our baseline increase was 300 basis decline in capacity u liza on could also be an explana on. There is indeed an approximately 15% drop in the Eurostat series for Hungarian capacity u liza on; which is large but s ll not sufficient to imply an unchanged employment level. From a growth accoun ng perspec ve, we are le with an unexplained drop in TFP. 10 The shock itself is 485 basis points. A er the endogenous response of all variables, the interest rate increases by 300 basis points. The (adjusted) steady state NFA per GDP posi on shi s by 1.01. 11 This exercise shows that there is a close mapping between our formula on of monetary policy (exchange rate smoothing) and a monetary reac on func on responding to changes in the foreign currency premium. Overall, we conclude that given the high level of indebtedness and currency mismatch, le ng the exchange rate float more freely would have been undesirable for the Hungarian economy. Defending the export sector would have come at the cost of a much larger increase in the interest premium, indebtedness, and a much bigger drop in consump on.
In our final exercise we repeat the policy comparison between a fixed and a rela vely flexible exchange rate regime, but assuming a lower level of ini al indebtedness. We keep the policy parameters as in the previous experiment, but change the ini al level of the non-reserve NFA to GDP ra o to -0.5875. 
Conclusion
We presented a simple two-sector small open economy model with a meaningful nominal and external financing side, which we u lized to study the adjustment process of a small open economy to a sudden worsening of external condi ons. By adop ng a highly non-linear specifica on of the endogenous external finance premium, we can add credit constraints into a small open economy model in a plausible, quan ta vely relevant yet tractable way. This is made possible by the fact that we work in a determinis c framework, and hence we are able to solve the model nonlinearly, even for a highly nonlinear and asymmetric specifica on for the interest premium func on. We calibrate the model to the performance of the Hungarian economy in the 2000s and its 2008 crisis experience in par cular. The main shock we are interested in is a permanent ghtening of external credit condi ons, implemented as a rise in the foreign interest premium. In order to match the ini al developments in these countries, we add a second, one period shock that captures the large drop in foreign demand. Then we also compute four counterfactuals: with two different exchange rate policies (more flexible and a perfect peg), both under the original and a lower level of ini al external indebtedness.
Overall, we judge the model's ability to fit key macroeconomic variables to be very good: all variables move in the expected direc on, and the magnitudes are reasonable. Our model also generates a quan ta vely meaningful tradeoff between le ng the currency depreciate and allowing for a quicker real adjustment of the economy, versus protec ng consump on expenditures by limi ng exchange rate movements and saving household balance sheets.
